"3 Para", by Patrick Bishop. 2007
This is actually the first account I read on the recent conflicts and sort of kick started everything that followed. I was inspired to pick this book up actually by two things. The first was a serious of tantalising documentaries by the BBC and ITV from imbedded journalists in Afghanistan that I found on Youtube. The second was that this book wasn’t written by a former soldier, because I was very wary of getting some biased account by a half literate squaddy seeking to big himself up. Instead Patrick Bishop is actually an historian who has written about servicemen in the Second World War. In a series of interviews with key personal and after some study of what documentary evidence is available he wrote this book. I was sure he would seek to give a more balanced account of 3 Para’s deployment in Afghanistan than an actual soldier.Bishop writes well and keeps you hooked with graphic accounts on the action. He also throws in some good biographical details of those involved as well as some general background of the parachute regiment itself. Many of those serving were actually inspired to join by a documentary in the 80’s called ‘P Company’ (available on Youtube) which appears to have established the genre for army training documentaries.
Cont…
posted by Benjamin Nakizo at 7:07 PM
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What comes across most is the sheer ferociousness of the fighting and the intense mental strain it placed on the soldiers. The British in Afghanistan decided to adopt decidedly different tactics to those employed by the Americans. However I am afraid to say that on the basis of this book it would appear that the British weren’t correct in doing so. The British adopted an approach whereby FOBs (Forward Operating Bases) would be established within Afghan cities from where patrols could be sent out to ensure the security of the immediate area. With the addition of more FOBs the British would eventually spread control over the entire city, much like a blot of ink spreading over a page. The individual spheres of influence would join up and hey presto, the town would be secured. This was the tried and tested approach that had worked in Northern Ireland.
The Americans on the other hand hated the thought of being caught up in the towns themselves and decided to build massive fortified camps out in the desert from where they could charge forth and chance the Taliban out of the region. The British system failed most likely through lack of numbers. The minute British troops arrived in the first FOBs they were under siege and simply surviving and pushing the attackers back long enough for supply drops to be made became the priority. Every single day the Taliban would attack the base and the Paras soon found it too dangerous to go out on patrol, instead staying firmly within their forts. The constant firefights coupled with the necessity for the outnumbered Paras to call in frequent air strikes inches from their own walls took a devastating toll on the town itself and won them no friends. The Taliban would barge into the homes and businesses of innocent locals and turn them into fire positions. When the British returned fire these innocent locals lost everything – and likely made them even more likely to support the Taliban in the future.
Indeed when the Paras weren’t fighting the Taliban they were in meetings with the locals in order to pay compensation for civilian casualties. As is the tribal culture of Afghanistan a crime, even murder, can be forgiven by making a cash donation to the victim’s family. Of course as is their custom the death of a woman is worth only half that of a man, and the British paid accordingly.
Despite these horrific and often counterproductive actions the Paras in these stories, supported by the occasional detachment of Canadian and Dutch forces were true heroes for surviving the way they did. Helicopters were easy prey for RPGs when they were required to land in FOBs so they would often retreat before being able to deliver their supplies. This combined with a general lack of helicopters anyway to create a very nasty situation for the men on the ground. Ammunition became a pressing concern and on many occasions the British troops faced the very real danger of having nothing left to throw at the Taliban but rocks. Hardly what one would expect from an elite unit in one of the world’s best-trained armies.
The situation did not impress the locals who often could not understand why the mighty armies of the west were cowering behind their mud brick walls, barely able to feed themselves, let alone repel the Taliban. This is something that crops up in other accounts too. The local Afghan people, as nasty as this sounds, respond to and respect force. The local population looked on with interest as the Taliban fought the British forces, waiting to see which one would prevail before committing their support. In a nation that has seen frequent civil wars in its recent history the people have come to know better than to support the losing side. The British and Taliban were competing for the hearts and minds of the towns population every day as they fired shots and rockets at one another. Unfortunately the Paras simply didn’t have the resources to impress the locals and take the fight to the Taliban – given this reality it is little wonder why the locals remained on the fence.
At the end of the Paratroopers deployment they were still no closer to securing the town and so (to the horror of the Americans) struck a deal with the Taliban and local population. In a three way meeting the British and the Taliban, who could both see that the bloodshed was getting them nowhere, agreed to leave the city to its own devices. The deal was done, hands were shaken, much green tea consumed and the British withdrew.
Weeks later the Taliban moved in, killed the local leaders who had initially proposed the compromise solution and took back control of the town. 3 Para’s efforts and sacrifices had essentially been in vain. The British approach did not work. Personally however it occurs to me that the British tactics weren’t necessarily wrong but rather that they simply weren’t backed up enough. If the Paras had had more men and more support they could have flooded the town, extended their influence and drive the Taliban out – just as planned. In the end all that was achieved was the numerous deaths of Taliban and British soliders, the destruction of civilian infrastructure and the eventual loss of the city the Paras had come to protect.
Overall this is a vivid account that details the immense bravery of British soldiers who desperately tried to do to much with too little. The lesson here is surely that when it comes to combat you either go all in, with everything you have, or you stay well clear. The halfhearted token gestures of many European nations can actually lead to a far worse situation.
"The British system failed most likely through lack of numbers."
This certainly seems to have been the case in the video footage we saw during Ross Kemp's second Afghanistan episode where a small force were pinned down from all sides, clustering together on a rooftop, scrambling for cover and calling in fire mission after fire mission in an attempt to break the onslaught.
Men, young men, placed in stressful and often harrowing conditions. The Afghan war is the right one and the Taliban need to be quelled. Unfortunately, with massively limited resources - amplified by negativity toward our involvement in the east, domestically and on the world stage, and through our failures in Iraq - the likelihood of our Afghan mission being a long-term success are reduced.
There was another sad issue raised in the programme. The citizens of cities are angry about their homes being destroyed' the occupation by foreign forces that brings no visible benefits. Rightly, Ross points out how the area is so unstable that to bring teachers and doctors into a Taliban controlled area would lead to a blood-filled catastrophe. The Taliban are using Mosques and civilian buildings to protect themselves. Urban warfare is immensely complex.
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